INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1250-1350 A.D.

Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350 (New York & Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1989) (From the book cover: "In this important study, Janet Abu-Lughod presents a groundbreaking reinterpretation of global economic evolution, arguing that the modern world economy had its roots not in the 16th century economy, as is widely supposed, but in the 13th century economy--a system far different from the European world system which emerged from it. Further, she argues, it was the devolution of the preexisting system that facilitated Europe's hegemonic rise; there was no inherent historical necessity shifting the system in favor of the West or preventing eastern societies from becoming the progenitors of a modern world system. Rather, the comparative ease with which Europe established its hegemony is attributable to prior and systemic demographic and geopolitical shifts." From the text: "My work on the history of Cairo had convinced me that the Eurocentric view of the Dark Ages was ill-conceived. If the lights went out in Europe, they were actually certainly still shining brightly in the Middle East. Visiting and studying most of the other major cities in that region of the world reassured me that Cairo was only one apex in a highly developed system of urban civilization." Id. at ix-x. "In the face of [] reorganization of the geopolitics of the world, the United Stats has attempted to retain its earlier hegemony by two strategies: one has been militarily, either directly or through regional surrogates; the second has been through the globalization of capital, a phenomenon not unrelated to the arms trade." "Both strategies may be meeting with declining success. Direct force of arms has resulted in an unrelieved series of real defeats, whereas indirect military ventures have succeeded chiefly in miring region after region in local conflicts in which the goal seems to be the perpetuation rather than the resolution of conflict. Although this serves to reduce the number of players in the world system, it does not eliminate all contenders and competitors. The United States has sought to build coalitions with the remaining powers through international finance. This has led, however, to such a level of international indebtedness that constant and further expansion seems impossible." Id. at 370-371.).

GLOBALIZATION, NOT SO NEW!

Jurgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century, translated from the German by Patrick Camiller (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton U. Press, 2014) (From "Introduction to the First German Edition" (2009): "All history inclines toward being world history." Id. at xv.).

Jurgen Osterhammel & Niels P. Petersson, Globalization: A Short History, translated from the German by Dona Geyer (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton U. Press, 2003, 2005) (From the bookjacket: "'Globalization' has become a popular buzzword for explaining today's world. The expression achieved teminological stardom in the 1990s and was soon embraced by the general public and integrated into numerous languages." "But is this much-discussed phenomenon really an invention of modern times? In this work, Jurgen Osterhammel and Niels O. Peterson make the case that globalization is not so new, after all." "Arguing that the world did not turn 'global' overnight, the book traces the emergence of globalization over the past seven or eight centuries. In fact, the authors write, the phenomenon can be traced back to early modern large-scale trading, for example, the silk trade between China and the Mediterranean region, the shipping routes between the Arabian Peninsula and India, and the more frequently traveled caravan routes of the Near East and North Africa--all conduits for people, goods, coins, artwork, and ideas." "Osterhammel and Petersson argue that the period from 1750 to 1880--an era characterized by the development of free trade and the long-distance impact of the industrial revolution--represented an important phase in the globalization phenomenon. Moreover, they demonstrate how globalization in the mid-twentieth century open up the prospect of global destruction through nuclear war and ecological catastrophe. In the end, the authors write, today's globalization is part of a long-running transformation and has not ushered in a 'global age' radically different from anytime that came before." From the text: "If any consensus exists among authors of the various persuasions, then it is the assumption that globalization challenges the importance of the nation-state and alters the balance of power between states and markets in favor of the latter. It is argued that those profiting from its development and from steps taken by national governments to facilitate free trade are the multinationals corporations, which can pick the least expensive options for direct investment worldwide without being hampered by loyalty to their countries of origin. The ability of national governments to influence economic development and their access to resources, especially taxes, is said to be impaired. The provisions of the welfare state are also being dismantled, thereby diminishing the legitimacy of the state--a development that in the eyes of neoliberal globalization enthusiasts means a gain of personal freedom, whereas for globalization opponents it is the onset of anarchy, which benefits only the strong. Thus, one of the central themes of social science today is the erosion of the (nation) state's external sovereignty, its domestic monopoly of force, and its ability to govern." Id. at 6-7.).

MODERATION IS DEAD, GLOBAL DISRUPTION IS REALITY.

Richard Dobbs, James Manyika, & Jonathan Woetzel, No Ordinary Disruption: The Four Global Forces Breaking All the Trends (New York: PublicAffairs, 2015) ("We believe that the world is now roughly in the middle of a dramatic transition as a result of four fundamental disruptive trends. . . The first is the shifting locus of economic activity and dynamism--to emerging markets like China and to cities within these markets. The emerging markets are going through the simultaneous industrial and urban revolutions that began in the nineteenth century in the developed world. The balance of power of the world economy is shifting east and south at a speed never before witnessed. . . The second disruptive force is the acceleration in the scope, scale, and economic impact of technology. . . . The third force changing the world is demographics. Simply put, the human population is getting older. Fertility is falling, and the world's population is graying dramatically. . . The final disruptive force is the degree to which the world is much more connected through trade and through movements of capital, people and information . . ." Id. at 4-7.).

INDIA'S PARTITION

Nisid Hajarai, Midnight's Furies: The Deadly Legacy of India's Partition (Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015) ("What truly continues to haunt today's world are the furies that were unloosed in 1947--the fears and suspicions and hatreds forged in partition's searing crucible. In those few weeks, and the few months that followed, a dangerous psychological chasm would open up between India and Pakistan. Leaders on both sides would suspect their counterparts of winking at genocide. Their mutual mistrust and scheming for advantage quickly brought their infant nations to the brink of war, and then ignited shadow contests for control over the kingdoms of Hyderabad in the south and Kashmir in the north. In less than a year, the Indian and Pakistani armies would confront one another on the battlefield." Id. at xix. See generally, William Dalrymple, The Great Divide," The New Yorker, June 29, 2015; and Aatish Taseer, "State of Disintegration," NYT Book Review, Sunday, July 12, 2015.). 

SECULAR VERSUS ANTI-SECULAR

Michael Walzer, The Paradox of Liberation: Secular Revolutions and Religious Counterrevolutions (New Haven & London: Yale U. Press, 2015) ("My project in this book is to describe a recurrent and, to my mind, disturbing pattern in the history of national liberation. I will discuss a small set of cases: the creation of the three independent states in the years after World War II--India and Israel in 1947-1948 and Algeria in 1962--and I will focus on the secular political movements that achieved statehood and the religious movements that challenged the achievement roughly a quarter century later." Id. at ix.  "I believe that my account, even in its simplest version, provides a useful beginning for a necessary inquiry: What happened to national liberation?" "Initially, at least, this is  success story: the three nations were indeed liberated for foreign rule. At the same time, however, the states that now exist are not the states envisioned by the original leaders and intellectuals of the national liberation movements, and the moral/political culture of these states, their inner life, so to speak, is not at all what their founders expected. One difference is central to my analysis . . .: all three movements were secular, committed, indeed, to an explicitly secular project, and yet in the states they they created a politics rooted in what we can loosely call fundamentalist religion is today very powerful. In three different countries, with three different religions, the timetable was remarkably similar: roughly twenty to thirty years after independence, the secular state was challenged by a militant religious movement. This unexpected outcome is a central feature of the paradox of national liberation." Id. at x-xii. "Readers who doubt that there has ever been a significant secular left in [America] should take a look at our earliest history. The first settlers and the political founders freed themselves or, better, began to free themselves, from the religious establishment of the Old World, and they set up what I think is the first secular state in world history. In a brief postscript, I will explain why the paradox that marks the twentieth-century cases is absent in eighteenth-century America. This is an argument for American exceptionalism, which I will make with one important qualification. However exceptional American were in the eighteenth century, we are less exception today." Id. at xiv.).

PHILIP II

Geoffrey Parker, Imprudent King: A New Life of Philip II (New Haven & London: Yale U. Press, 2014).

SHADES OF GRAY

Josep Pia, The Gray Notebook, translated by Peter Bush (New York: New York Review Books, 2014) (Alan Riding, "Language Without a Country," NYT Book Review, Sunday, 4/20/2014).